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Abstract—Malicious software is detected and classified by either 
static analysis or dynamic analysis. In static analysis, malware 
samples are reverse engineered and analyzed so that signatures of 
malware can be constructed. These techniques can be easily 
thwarted through polymorphic, metamorphic malware, 
obfuscation and packing techniques, whereas in dynamic analysis 
malware samples are executed in a controlled environment using 
the sandboxing technique, in order to model the behavior of 
malware. In this paper, we have analyzed Petya, Spyeye, 
VolatileCedar, PAFISH etc. through Agent-based and Agentless 
dynamic sandbox systems in order to investigate and benchmark 
their efficiency in advanced malware detection. 
Keywords-Malware detection; Static analysis, Dynamic analysis, 
Cuckoo, VMRay 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Malicious software also referred  as a “Malware” in the cyber 
security domain [1] saw a significant increase in number of 
variants. The Internet security report of Symantec concluded 
that 350 million malware variants were developed in 2016 [2], 
while Panda Security indicated that, on average, 160,000 new 
malware programs appeared every day in 2013 [3]. The 
significant growth in malware variants is due to the ubiquitous 
nature of computer systems and networks as well as the 
potential financial benefits of gaining access to computer 
systems and/or their data.  
Although several methods based on shallow architecture 
have been used in the past by AV companies to detect malware 
variants, which are either signature based [4], or heuristic-based 
[5], authors of malware often chose to implement robust, 
stealthy and sophisticated methods, such as obfuscation, 
polymorphic and metamorphic mechanism, in order to impede 
commercial antivirus companies. To cope with the thousands 
of new malware samples that are discovered every day, security 
companies and analysts use different techniques. Malware 
samples are analyzed usually through static and dynamic 
analysis. In the static analysis, the executable binary of 
malware sample is analyzed without executing it. This 
technique is widely used by AV companies to detect malware 
as this technique uses the concept of pattern recognition and 
detect malware signature by using a common sequence of bytes  
in the binary code of a malware. This technique is fast and does 
not need any controlled environment to run samples, but it can 
be easily thwarted through obfuscation, packing, and code 
rearranging techniques and it fails to cover the zero-day malware 
attack [6]. In dynamic analysis malware, samples are executed 
and monitored in the controlled environment in order to 
understand the runtime behavior. This approach is computing 
intensive as it requires running the malware samples in an 
isolated sandbox environment in order to obtain artifacts and 
features, but it tends to have higher accuracy in characterizing 
malware samples. This technique is agnostic to the underlying 
code and can easily bypass code obfuscation and polymorphic 
coding. 
Security analysts widely use different techniques, tools and 
mechanisms to perform behavior analysis. One of the most 
widely used tools for malware behavior modeling is Cuckoo, 
although researchers also prefer tools like VirMon, and 
WINAPIOverride32 to do malware analysis. All these tools 
have their own strength and weakness that ultimately affect the 
feature engineering process and sometimes the distinct features 
of great importance are skipped because of inherent limitations 
of these tools, which result in the poor performance of 
classification systems. In this paper, we aim to compare the 
efficiency and efficacy of agent-based and agent-less sandboxes 
in terms of detecting sophisticated malware variants. We use the 
Cuckoo agent-based sandbox and the VMRay agent-less 
sandbox for behavioral modeling of malware and later on, we 
measure the effectiveness of these tools in terms of detecting 
malicious software in general and, more specifically, 
sophisticated malicious software. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
Relevant work, Section III Proposed research work, IV 
Experimental results, In Section V Future work, VI Conclusion 
and in Section VII Acknowledgment. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Malware detection, clustering, and classification represents 
also a hot topic for academic researchers and industry 
professionals, here we are presenting different approaches 
which have used so far for detecting malware. First, some 
methods, which use static features, are described and then 
dynamic features are explained. Authors of [7] used static 
analysis to detect malware and benign samples by extracting 4-
gram features from portal executable and later on these features 
were used to distinguish a benign sample from the malicious 
sample. In a more recent study, Opcode was used to detect 
malicious files [8]. Malware samples were reverse engineered 
to get an opcode, which is part of machine language instruction 
and depict the operations to be performed. It plays important 
role in distinguishing the legitimate software from malicious 
software. In [9] the authors presented a model to detect 
malware variants on the base of the byte frequency. In this 
model, suspicious malware is detected if its byte frequency is 
similar to some known malware class. In [10], the focus is on 
API sequence, which appears to be more frequently in most of 
the malware files and then applied similarity measure for the 
sequence. In [11], researchers proposed a model to detect 
suspicious samples by calculating frequencies of features for 
e.g. Dynamic link libraries, APIs and PE header, then use the 
information to gain feature selection to mark samples as 
malware or benign. In [12], authors proposed a malware 
classification system based on an n-gram feature vector. 
Dynamic analysis was done to get network level artifacts and 
then from these artifacts, n-gram feature vector was 
constructed and later on used for classification of malware. 
Authors in this paper claim to achieve 80% accuracy in 
classification by using a number of machine learning 
algorithms. Researchers in [13], analysed the system states 
changes, such as the number of new processes created, file 
written etc. The proposed method was evaluated on unseen 
malware variants whose signature was not available at the time 
and used a tree structure based on single linkage clustering to 
measure similarity among the various groups of malware. 
In [14], the authors tried to address a problem related to the 
packing of malware, a technique based on obfuscation method 
to hide malware code in software. To address this problem, 
authors propose a technique that generates the signature of 
every packed malware. The dataset for analysis was divided 
into two parts. The first part is used for constructing between 
different systems entities, which include processes, system 
register etc. and other part for testing and evaluation. Authors 
in [15] propose a detection system based on a quantitative data 
flow model and then use graphs to depict the communication 
between different systems entities, which include processes, 
system register etc. Researchers in [16] concluded that there 
are repetitive actions on data sequence that malware mostly do,  
such as loops performing decryption or encryption, and this 
can be addressed through iterative system calls pattern mining. 
In [17], it was assumed that behavior of each executable can be 
represented by the values of register contents in its run-time.  
Researcher in [18] used 4-grams to model API call sequences. 
By comparison of the average confidence  of all 4-grams, 




 [19] introduced a model sample behavior based on 2-gram 
features through system calls and their arguments by using 
prioritizing arguments. It successfully identified novel classes of 
malware with similar behavior and assigning unknown malware 
to these discovered classes. Researchers in [20] removed the 
function libraries constructed by benign files from those which 
appeared in malware as segment threat, calculated segment 
entropy and extracted 3-grams Opcode for each segment. 
In [21], in contrast to traditional techniques, the authors used 
iterative pattern mining to detect malware based on the 
assumption that malware do repetitive action on data sequence 
ranging from running infections to running loops, which perform 
a decryption/encryption process. The authors of the study break 
down the overall process into five steps. In the first step, they 
gathered malware samples and in next step, they captured PE 
interaction with operating system APIs by running these samples 
in the controlled virtual environment for e.g. VMWARE and 
Qemu are used. In this step API, call logs are used to construct 
the dataset and furthermore, in this, they see iterative API 
patterns that occur more than a minimum threshold. In the last 
step, they use pattern features as a dataset to classify malware. 
Different algorithms are used to train model for e.g. SVM, 
Random Forest etc. and they claim to achieve 95% accuracy with 
98.4% detection rate. 
III. PROPOSED RESEARCH WORK 
As summarized in section II, prior research led to capable 
platforms for dynamic analysis of malware. These are two 
types: Basic dynamic analysis and advance dynamic analysis 
platform. Dynamic analysis tools such as Capture-Bat, 
Regshot, APATE DNS, PEID, PE explorer, or Sysinternal were 
used to carry out the analysis, whereas advanced dynamic 
analysis tools like Virmon, Cuckoo, WINAPIOverride32 were 
used to model the behavior of malware. Most of the advanced 
dynamic analysis platforms are agent-based, and they usually 
drop their agent on the analysis machine to capture the features 
of malicious software, but current malware are intelligent 
enough to circumvent analysis when they find themselves being 
analyzed by the agent base sandbox and detonate themselves 
before being analyzed. In this research, we have taken both 
agent-based and agent-less sandbox and executed the malware 
sets in these environments in order to find which one is the best 
for capturing sophisticated malware features as shown in  fig.1.    
 
Fig 1. Conceptual model 
     TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED MALWARE CLASSIFICATION METHODS WITH CURRENT STUDY. 
 
Author Name Year Technique used Features Representation 
L. Bilge and T. 2014 Dynamic analysis communication between different system entities (processes, sockets, Data Flow Graph 
Dumitras   files or system registries)  
Mohaisen et al 2014 Dynamic analysis N-gram feature of the network artifacts N-gram 
Ahmadi et al 2013 Dynamic analysis executables’ API call Graph 
Ghiasi et al 2013    Dynamic analysis register values The binary vector of 
Features 
Ravi and 2012 Dynamic analysis API call sequences N-gram 
Manoharan     
Rieck et al 2011 Dynamic analysis system calls and their arguments N-gram, Binary vector of 
    Features 
Tahan et al 2012 Dynamic analysis API calls and their parameters The binary vector of 
Features 
Mansour Ahmadi 2013 Iterative pattern API, call logs API,call logs 
et al  mining   
 
 For conducting this research, we have used two different 
testbeds one with Cuckoo Sandbox and another with VMRay 
analyzer Sandbox. Cuckoo Sandbox is an open source widely 
used platform to model the behavior of malware in a controlled 
environment. It was developed as a summer project in 2010 in 
Google sponsored summer code project. The propose of this 
malware analysis system is to provide automatic analysis of 
malware for e.g. files created, deleted, API calls, argument and 
there return values etc. Cuckoo mainly focus on DLL, PDF, 
office documents, and different executables for windows and 
further consider Java files. VMRay Analyzer is agentless 
dynamic behavior analysis tool for malware. Unlike other 
established sandbox solutions in the market, it is embedded in 
the hypervisor in order to monitor the behavior of malware and 
overcome the problem in tradition sandboxes, thus malware 
could not able to detect that it is being detonated in control 
environment One reason for choosing VMRay analyzer is that 
it overcome the advance evasion techniques and another 
reason for choosing is its significant features for e.g. Evasion 
Resistance,  Customizable Yet Automated, Easy Deployment, 
VMRay’s Reputation Engine and Seamless Integration as 
shown in Table II.    
In the first one, we used VMware workstation version 
(12.5.9) virtual environment, where we set up a virtual 
machine of Ubuntu (16.04 LTS) with Cuckoo sandbox 
installed on it to carry out the dynamic analysis of malware in 
order to get the artifacts of malicious software for 
understanding the behavior of malware. To execute malware 
in control environment in Ubuntu we have set up VBox with a 
Windows XP-SP3 machine, furthermore, the cuckoo agent 
was installed on the XP virtual machine along with some other 
software so that it can effectively capture the behavior of 
malicious variants when they are executed. In the second 
testbed, we have used VMRay analyzer, which was hosted on 
the VMRay cloud environment and we were been given 
special access by VMRay analyzer company for 30 days to 
perform our experiments. The testbed environment in the 
cloud was configured with almost all versions of Windows 
ranging from Windows XP (SP1, SP2, and SP3), Windows 7, 





Moreover, in order to understand the behavior more clearly 
these machines were configured with all necessary software for 
e.g. MS Office 2007,2010,2013, Acrobat Reader version 
9,10,12 etc. In our proposed conceptual model, we have used 
Cuckoo and VMRayanalyzer  as shown in the fig. 2 and fig.3 
to do a comparison of artifacts extracted by both the Sandboxes 
as shown in Table II. 
 









DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CUCKOO AND VMRAY ANALYZER 
 
 
Cuckoo ×                          ×                                              ×   √     √ √      
VMRay 
Analyzer 
√                          √                                              √                                              √                         √                       √ 
    
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We have taken malicious samples from different sources such 
as contagion dump and Zoo and executed these samples in both 
environments. Here we are mentioning the results of few of 
them, including The Ransomware Petya, Spyeye, Volatile 
Cedear, Dyre, and PAFISH. These samples were executed in 
both Agent-based and Agentless environment on a different 
version of Windows for e.g. Windows 7 (SP-1 32 bit and 64 
bit), Windows 8(64bit) and Windows 10(64 bit) respectively as 
shown in the fig. 4. The behavior and actions of malicious 
samples were analyzed through dynamic analysis mechanisms 
using two different types of sandboxes: i) Agent-based sandbox 
and ii) Agentless sandbox tools. We performed empirical 
analysis by executing different samples of malware in both 
Agent-based and Agentless sandbox environments and find that 
agentless sandbox is more efficient in detecting sophisticated 
malware, which bypasses or crash themselves on finding 
themselves being detected by sandbox agent. The motivation 
behind this research is to model the behavior of those malware 
variants, which are able to thwart the agent base sandboxes and 
as a result, they are not detected.  
 
 
Fig. 4 Ransomware Wannacry 
 
 
During the analysis, we closely monitored the changes 
occurring in the operating resource for e.g. DNS requests, 
HTTP requests, file related activities, registry related 







 IRC commands, and process tree we have seen during our 
experiment that whenever we try to execute some of the 
advance malware for e.g. Wanna Cry, Petya in Cuckoo it 
usually gives us very limited features and was unable to 
produce features which are helpful in understanding the 
behavior of malware. 
In our view, the reason behind this is that almost of all 
advance malware usually monitor the running environment 
when they are executed and on finding the analysis platform 
they usually stop their execution or in some case give only 
insignificant features, whereas in contrast when these advance 
malware were executed in Agentless Sandbox the results were 
totally opposite and we were able to capture some of the 
features of significant importance for e.g. Zero-day detection, 
visualization of relationship between parent and child processes 
of malware etc. as shown in Table II, moreover we find that 
these features will play an important role in designing advance 
threat detection and mitigation platform and we will prove the 
significance of these features in our future work, so from our 
analysis we came to this conclusion that agentless sandboxes 
are more effective and robust in terms of capturing intelligent 
malware and in extracting their features.  
V. FUTURE WORK 
This session discusses our future work and framework 
comprising three stages: the monitoring phase, feature-
engineering phase, and learning stage. 
A. Monitoring stage 
 
Fig. 5 Indigenous Sandbox for Dynamic analysis 
In the monitoring stage, we will take malware samples from 
different classes and then will execute them to control the the 
environment in order to model the behavior of malicious 
software. For behavior analysis, we will use our indigenous in-
house made agentless sandbox or some open-source Agentless 
sandbox as shown in the fig.5. and the reason behind using this 
Sandbox Zero Day  Visualization of parent-child Evasion of Anti-analysis technique Files related Registry related API  
 Detection relationship Possible or not? activities activities calls  
 
tool is that we have found from experiments that Agentless 
Sandboxes are evasion resistance and nowadays sophisticated 
malware and APTs can detect it is being observed, therefore, as 
a result, they stop their executions. Also features used in [23] 
will be taken into consideration so we can collect as much 
information as possible from the execution of the malware.  
B. Feature Engineering stage 
In this phase, feature sets will be created based on API calls 
and their argument as this is done by extracting string 
information from the text files generated by our indigenous tool 
or open source tool. Once we get the features, we will apply 
feature selection techniques to get significant feature sets and. 
In the last stage of this phase different NLP techniques for e.g. 
n-grams will be used to convert features into binary vectors, 
which are, later on, feed to deep learning algorithm for training 
purpose as shown in the fig. 6. 
C. Learning and verification stage 
In this stage, the binary vector will be given to Learning 
algorithm as shown in fig. 6. In our case, we will use generative 
algorithms and our focus will be on deep belief network DBN 




Fig. 6. Cyber Intelligent System for Malware detection 
 
representations of objects even if the specific object changes 
its size, contrast, angle etc. and they had produced very 
promising results in a number of image classification projects, 
moreover possess high accuracy. Moreover, the use of game 
theoretic models and trust will be explored [24]. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we reviewed past approaches for detecting 
malware through either static or through dynamic analysis, 
furthermore, we found that dynamic analysis is an effective 
approach for the behavioral analysis of malware. Dynamic 
analysis is usually carried out in sandbox environment, in our 
research we find that traditional sandboxes are not evasive 
resistance because they hook data by dropping their agent in 
control environment which can be detected by intelligent 
malware and as a result they don’t unpack or execute 
themselves on finding agent, so in our research we find that 
Agentless Sandbox is the best solution for dynamic analysis. 
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